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“. . . it is hard, very hard indeed, for an individual to change his
behavior and seek a more sane and less destructive personal ecology
(it means changing many things, including the work that you do, the
way that you live and the things that you believe); it is harder still
to convince large numbers of people to consider the consequences of
their total behavior and modify this behavior so as to alleviate its
destructive results.” Daniel Kozlovsky1
“We need to fashion a new philosophy consistent with the constraints of the
Age of Ecology.”2
Gnostic Christian, Taoist, Buddhist, Sufi, Wiccan and traditional Amerindian
epistemologies are only a few exciting basic philosophies that are suitable for an
ecological age. Many, many individuals are even now oriented to ecologically
benign ways of living.
Drengson echoes a similar statement by Kozlovsky: “. . . the present culture
cannot relate nondestructively to the natural environment; it does not provide
very many acceptable personal environments or nondestructive personal rela-
tionships, and it has as its philosophical foundation ideas and principles that
are so inconsistent with what we know of biology, so superstitious, so wretchedly
ignorant and prescientific as to be utterly ridiculous.”3 The need that Drengson
identifies is not a new one. However, it is even more urgent now because we seem
to be rapidly reaching the limits of the biosphere to accommodate destructive
interactions with humans.
Our interest is not so much in the “need to fashion a new philosophy consistent
with the constraints of an Age of Ecology”, but with what we believe is the
more pressing problem of bringing about change toward such philosophies even
as they are emerging within evolving world views. As Kozlovsky puts it, this
will necessitate basic changes in the work that we do and in how we assign
importance to it, in the way that we live and allow others to live and in the
things to which we hold so tenaciously. We perceive the need for basic changes
in and to both ontological and epistemological being. In this paper we present
a way in which such change may be understood, enacted and sustained.
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Change and Transformation
There is a voluminous literature on change and how to make it come about,
whether in society at large, in the workplace, in the home, or for the individual.
Much of this literature focuses on concepts such as change agents, institutional
structure, the flow of authority, fluidity of communication, source of initiative,
and so on. While acknowledging the existence of this work, we wish to explore
another way. Indeed, we surmise that much of the inertia of current thinking
about change is precisely the philosophy within which such thinking occurs. It
is a philosophy quite different from that for which Drengson calls.
We frame our point of departure by specifying two search strategies: First,
we look for a way of understanding current philosophies in relation to how we
bring forth the world; second, we look for a way of understanding creativity as
a source of transformation within and across philosophies. In both cases, our
search would be confined to work that is congruent with the constraints of the
deep ecology movement. Our intent is to generate an interactive framework
within which transformation can be understood as a manifestation of creativity
within and across philosophies.
Our search for ways of understanding current philosophies in relation to how
we bring forth the world has led to a close reading of the work of the Japanese
systems philosopher Magoroh Maruyama. Our search for a way of understand-
ing creativity has led us to work of Morris Berman, philosopher of science.
What is encouraging for us in the work of both men is that they themselves
present their major theses within the framework of typologies. It is therefore
convenient, particularly in a short paper, to present the gist of their thinking in
typological form. Much more important, however, is the fact that these typolo-
gies can themselves be used to generate a formal way of framing an interactive
integration of philosophy with creativity such that transformation within and
across philosophies can be specified and enacted. This transformation may also
be anticipated as movement within and across categories in a jointly interactive
second order typology that emerges from the interaction.
In the remainder of this paper we briefly present:
• Maruyama’s Typology of Epistemology
• Berman’s Typology of Creativity
• A generative transformation matrix formed from these two typologies
• An expression of philosophical change congruent with deep ecology as
embodied in the matrix
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Maruyama’s Typology of Epistemology
In discussing Maruyama’s work, we take his use of the term “epistemologies”
as equivalent to our use of the term “philosophies”. Further, he uses the term
“Mindscapes” to refer to his typology of epistemologies. This charming term
suggests the metaphor of “landscapes of the mind” and “travel across and within
landscapes of the mind” and therefore provides a ready vocabulary for trans-
formation. We use his vocabulary in preference to the terms used earlier in this
paper.
As a systems philosopher, Maruyama’s basic work is perhaps best expressed
in a 1980 publication “Mindscapes and Science Theories”, in which he argued
for the explication of a much more comprehensive and anthropologically based
understanding of the epistemologies that researchers bring to their work and
which imbues their work in hidden and unsuspecting ways. His paper presented
four Mindscapes types, not as a comprehensive set of categories, but as indi-
cators pointing to the range of differing epistemologies that he had personally
encountered in over 30 years of research. For a summary of his canonical work
see Caley & Sawada (1994).4
Mindscapes types are fundamentally different in epistemological terms. That
which is consistent within a particular mindscape may be inconsistent across
mindscapes. By reporting evidence from business and government, he makes
the case that mindscapes are highly resistant to change. For example, business
and government leaders often make decisions “from the gut” and use “logical
arguments” a posteriori to support the initial position. They are quite resistant
to information that contradicts their “gut” feeling. In 1993, for example, the
governments of Canada and Alberta deliberately ignored the primary recom-
mendations of the Environmental Review Panel to decommission the Old Man
River Dam in Alberta. Instead, they chose to focus on the secondary recom-
mendation to “minimize” environmental impacts.
An extremely brief description of Maruyama’s Typology of Mindscapes is pre-
sented in Table 1. For a more comprehensive understanding of Maruyama’s
work see Caley & Sawada (1994).
Table 1: Typology of Mindscapes
Berman’s Typology of Creativity
Berman (1989)5discovered the basis for his typology in work by Freud on cre-
ativity. He recognized that the basic typology had the potential to help us
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understand aspects of creativity trans-culturally. Table is Berman’s synopsis,
slightly expanded by the authors, of his modified version of Freud’s typology.
The Table is quite brief, however, we believe that the reader will be able to fol-
low Berman’s reasoning. The reader must be able to accept the basic premise
that creativity is in some fundamental sense both effected and affected by the
degree of sensual repression inflicted by parents during infancy. This repression
can be perceived as a continuum from essentially complete repression to almost
no repression. The degree of repression is a function of both social mores and
parental personal mores within the social mores.
Table 2: Berman’s Typology of Creativity (expanded by the authors):
Sensual curiosity about the world (ages 2-5). &#9; Repression
With respect to the typology, Berman makes the following comments about
each category:
1. “There is not much to say about Type I creativity, since it is the counter-
example, the decision to give up on creativity (and really on life) alto-
gether. The repression is so effective that all creative expression is blocked
forever.”
2. “Type II, the neurotic model, was — as far as Freud was concerned —
typical of most creative work . . . the creative work has an obsessive
quality to it; one is ‘married’ to one’s work, as the saying goes. Tension
and passion are characteristic modes of expression here.”
3. “Type III is the least familiar case, the repression is very slight, and the
translation of sensual energy or exploring spirit into the creative work
is carried out with the minimum of trauma. Such work has a relaxed,
spontaneous feel to it.”
The three types are descriptive of many of the kinds of creativity that are
manifest in Western and perhaps all cultures. Berman describes Type III (non-
neurotic) as an “empty category” in Western culture except for Pre-Renaissance
and children’s art which are not “compulsive or conflict ridden.” Our comment
here is that Type III is empty only within the context of modern Western
epistemologies and that, within these, individuals and small groups have been
and are outside this tradition. It is evident that Type III, in other cultures, is
not only not empty but also may be the predominant category.
Type II creativity describes those characteristics which we usually ascribe to
those persons who are seen to be creative giants in their fields. However, we
all recognize that, in typical Western societies, these people are often extremely
compulsive, egocentric, and, at worst, self-destructive. So the creative geniuses
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of Western cultures since the Renaissance have been and are the most neurotic.
We tend to associate genius and neurotic behaviour, and often excuse the latter
in favour of the former. There is a subtle, or not so subtle, irony that often
those whom we most admire, call genius and hold up as role models are often
the most neurotic. (Madonna, Magic Johnson, Gaugin and Michael Jackson
come immediately to mind.) When this compulsion is directed towards art,
science, commerce, politics and other socially acceptable pursuits we accept
and even applaud the bizarre behaviour that often accompanies it.
On the other hand, if the outlet of creativity becomes destructive, we label it
neurotic. This can lead to social approbation, incarceration, and even death
(e.g. Michael Millikan, Freddie Prinz, etc). In many cultures, especially tradi-
tional ones, Type II individuals would be considered insane or, at least, socially
undesirable (i.e. traditional Amerindian, Maori, Inuit).
There is evidence that Type III is not an “empty category.” Berman notes
that Pre-Renaissance western art and music belongs in this category as well as
much Eastern art and, we think, most traditional folk art. Other aspects of
Eastern culture, specifically the Japanese concept of Shibusa,6belongs in this
category as well.7Note, that in order to fill the empty category, we are forced
to look outside our own culture or at least at the fringes of our society. (e.g.
communes, spiritual centres, alternate-lifestyle centres, fictional literature and
comic strips).
Transformation = Mindscapes X Creativity
There is a sense in which being creative is its own transformation. To be contin-
ually involved in the creative act is to be continually creating and renewing both
the world and one’s place in it. And yet to be creative in an H or I Mindscape
is quite different from being creative in an S or G Mindscape. For example,
a creative H Mindscape would likely produce new products and technologies
and interpret their worth strictly within the hierarchy of present social systems
(little or no recursive thinking). In contrast, a creative S Mindscape will experi-
ence the creative process as itself a significant product and would be sensitive to
the effect such engagement would have on the quality of being creative (highly
recursive thinking).
Because the creative process is different in different Mindscapes, we feel it worth-
while to explore the different varieties of creativity by generating a matrix using
Maruyama’s and Berman’s typologies as the axes. When we developed the ma-
trix and began to fill in the cells using the information from the typology of
each author (Maruyama and Berman), we were surprised by four outcomes that
emerged in the process.
1. It became immediately apparent that certain cells seemed to be empty.
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Thus H x TIII may not be possible since its defining components, from each
typology, appear to be mutually incompatible. It seems to be impossible to
have an H mindscape centred upon a rigidly hierarchical concept of the world
and simultaneously entertain a Type III creativity based upon a non-repressive
sensuality.
2. As we examined the contents of each cell, particular famous people, real
and fictional, came to mind. For instance, I x TIII could be typified by the
fictional character Rambo and G x TllI may be characterized by the Laozi (Lao
Tse). These people are social icons. Each icon carries much more information
than the original descriptive text and makes the information in each cell more
transparent. There is an empathy with real or fictional characters that is missing
from a simple statement about the interaction of components.
Table 3
3. Once the “iconization of the cells” became apparent, we also noticed that, as
we completed the matrix, there was a distinct flow from the upper left to the
lower right, with respect to the development of sensitivity to things, persons
and place. This flow is much more obvious when the icons replace descriptive
statements about the nature of each cell. It seemed to us that change toward
ecologically supportive epistemologies could be understood as a journey across
the matrix moving toward the bottom right corner. Given that everyone who
has developed an environmentally supportive epistemology has made their way
through some or all of the conceptual stances exemplified by these icons, we
began to wonder about ways of helping those who oppose environmental reform
to catch the flow.
We have not tried to be exhaustive in completing the cells since each reader will
have personal social icons that evoke even stronger personal meaning. Also, the
reader may disagree with our placement of icons. The matrix is, after all, only
a mechanism for generating transformation. For example, we have deliberately
chosen and shown several persons straddling the boundaries between cells. This
was done to demonstrate that the boundaries are merely convenient thought
categories and nothing more. In effect, we were “playing with the rules”. More
significantly, the straddling also indicates movement, movement toward another
cell, and this sort of movement itself constitutes transformation in personal
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Table 4
epistemological space. It is specifically this kind of movement, particularly
movement toward G XT III that is central to the intent of this paper. Such
movement is itself an enaction of Type III creativity.
We urge readers to reconstruct our matrix using their own icons. Make the
matrix a useful working tool, not just an interesting exercise in philosophy! We
believe that this exercise may be explicitly useful to those who are engaged in
confrontational situations involving ecologically sensitive issues. (i.e. logging of
old growth forests, pulp mill construction, preservation of endangered species
habitat, recycling programs, etc.). Perhaps if the protagonists are placed within
the matrix, ways of influencing their epistemological transformation may become
more apparent.
Toward Epistemologies of Deep Ecology
How can each person begin a journey along the diagonal path towards G x
III, which represents what is best known as enlightenment? Many paths have
been determined and validated for such attainment, but all are known to be
long, arduous, and self-selected (Zen, Taoism, and Buddhism). Remembering
Kozlovsky’s statements, it is not reasonable to expect very many people to elect
to take these paths.
We now will address the question posed at the beginning of this paper. We take
the concept of sustainable development as an example to show this movement.
. x TI sustainable development is not in this reality
. x TII sustainable development is a facade used to assist in the accumulation
of personal wealth and power. Under social pressure sustainable development
is accepted but when entered on the balance sheet is listed as a liability. Sus-
tainability is the concept of maintaining what you have; there is no thought of
change, except what is forced by external events. Big players establish the rules;
small players play within them.
. x TII in this cell, two types of sustainability emerge; sustainable development
and sustainable environment. Advocates of the former have accepted explicitly
or implicitly the perpetuation of current economic systems; advocates of the
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latter have realized that current systems are incompatible with sustainable en-
vironment. Both recognize the need for change in habits or behaviour, but offer
quite different courses of action with different, often conflicting, outcomes.
. x TIII this is the way of being one with the world so that sustainability is
simply actionless action (Caley & Sawada, 1990). In Kozlovsky’s (p. 11) words,
“We know today that the evolutionary process has no overriding scheme, no final
goal. The living world is not going anywhere.” We invite readers to articulate
more precisely how deep ecology emerges in this space.
The matrix, by generating embodiments of many different world views, demon-
strates that movement through contrasting epistemologies is possible. It also
suggests impediments to such movement (i.e., the contradictory elements in H
x TIII). We invite readers to explore the matrix in order to create new ways for
bringing individuals to deep ecology and to resolving conflicts within ecosophy
and other critical areas.
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